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FROM ‘IRON FISTS’ TO ‘BUNCHES OF FIVES’: 
A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON DIALOGUE 
(OR LIAISON) APPROACHES TO POLICING 
POLITICAL PROTEST
David P. Waddington
United Kingdom
Keywords: Police liaison, dialogue policing, political protest
Abstract: This article focuses on the recent academic assertion that police attempts to engage in 
dialogue before and during protest events (ostensibly to facilitate the participants’ preferred means of 
political expression) are perhaps more realistically concerned with collecting useful intelligence about 
demonstrators’ likely motives and activities, and preparing advance justification for possible police 
interventions. A case study is presented of the work carried out by a 15-person South Yorkshire Police 
‘Police Liaison Team’ (PLT) in relation to the ‘anti-Lib Dem’ political protest occurring in the major 
English city of Sheffield in March 2011. Using a combination of participant observation and interviews 
with police and demonstrators, the study highlights compelling similarities between the tactical 
approach and underlying objectives of the PLT and those subscribed to by public order specialists in the 
Metropolitan Police Service in the early 1990s. In common with their ‘Met’ counterparts, the PLT used 
carefully cultivated exchange relationships with protest organisers as means of gathering intelligence, 
securing compliance with police preferences for the routes of marches and establishing parameters 
of ‘acceptable’ behaviour. However, by using the relatively new tactic of immersing themselves in the 
crowd, PLT members were also able to maintain ‘open’ lines of communication with protesters and 
provide a stream of unerringly accurate ‘dynamic risk assessments’ to remote senior commanders. This 
tactic helped to ensure that there were few unsettling ‘surprises’ on both sides, that there were no 
unnecessary, indiscriminate or over-punitive police interventions, and that the police operation was 
ultimately regarded by protest organisers as having been exceptionally tolerant and ‘facilitating’. 
INTRODUCTION
A recent article by Baker (2013) considers the 
extent to which the growing use of ‘dialogue 
policing’ (with its accent on liaising and 
negotiating with demonstrators before and during 
political protests) represents a bona fide means 
of promoting the ‘right’ to protest, or actually 
constitutes little more than a disingenuous form 
of ‘symbolic theatre’ — a ‘ritualistic sham’. The 
latter perspective is alluded to in Baker’s article 
by the co-organiser of an Australian climate 
camp protest (‘Switch off Hazelwood, Switch 
off Coal, Switch off Renewable’) who likens 
negotiations with the police to a ‘smoke and 
mirrors chess game’, involving both sides vying 
for relevant information, and also establishing a 
moral position of ‘we’ve spoken to you, you’ve 
spoken to us, we’ve played friendly. On the day, 
how much of what you’ve committed to will you 
stand by?’ (quoted in ibid., pp. 94-95).
While such evidence leads Baker to conclude that 
‘ritualistic games’ of this nature are undoubtedly 
replete with ulterior motives on all sides, he insists 
that they tend also to be mutually beneficial, 
not least by helping to legitimise and facilitate 
peaceful dissent while allowing the police to 
‘maintain control by conveying expectations for 
crowd behaviour and remaining in control of 
public space’ (ibid., p. 100). All of this may well 
entail ‘lingering suspicion on both sides’, allied 
to police contingency planning (‘a dual mode of 
policing’) in cases where uncooperative groups 
of protesters spurn the invitation to negotiate 
(ibid., p. 100); but even in situations where it fails 
to become all-encompassing, dialogue remains a 
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vitally important mechanism insofar as it ‘creates 
the context for a better understanding, a greater 
chance of negotiated outcomes and protester 
compliance, and enhanced predictability for the 
parties involved’ (ibid.).
These views chime with those of UK academics 
who, like the present author, have generally 
approved of recent attempts by British police 
forces to help ‘facilitate the right to protest’ by 
adopting communication-based tactics and 
strategies, based on seminal Swedish Dialogue 
Policing approaches (Gorringe et al., 2012; 
Gorringe and Rosie, 2013; Stott et al., 2013; D. 
Waddington, 2013). Such methods are consistent 
with official recommendations appearing in the 
wake of the controversial policing of the 2009 
G20 protest in central London (HMCIC, 2009a, 
2009b). On that occasion, the Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS) were heavily criticised for 
using over-zealous tactics which saw hundreds 
of protesters ‘kettled’ (contained and detained) 
for several hours, and an innocent bystander 
(Ian Tomlinson) die of injuries sustained during 
an unwarranted assault by a police officer which 
only reached public attention when a ‘citizen 
journalist’ disclosed relevant video footage to The 
Guardian newspaper (Greer and McGlaughlin, 
2010; Rosie and Gorringe, 2009).
This strong commitment to using effective 
communication and dialogue also underpins 
the GODIAC project (e.g. GODIAC, 2013), a 
European Union-funded initiative involving 
case studies of protest policing in nine separate 
nations, whose recommendations for a common 
European approach to policing ‘political 
manifestations’ firmly endorse the four key 
‘principles of conflict reduction’ identified by 
Reicher and his co-workers — namely: education 
(understanding the various ‘social identities’, 
values, beliefs and objectives of the different 
sections of the crowd); facilitation (striving to 
help protesters achieve their legitimate goals); 
communication (employing negotiation, prior 
to and during the event, with the intention 
of reaching agreements, and avoiding any 
misunderstandings or unpleasant surprises); and 
differentiation (resisting the inclination to treat 
all members of the crowd in uniform manner, 
irrespective of whether they are ‘guilty’ or 
‘innocent’) (Reicher et al. 2007).
7What UK commentators in particular have not 
sufficiently emphasised is the degree to which 
this ‘new’ dialogue approach shares compelling 
similarities with the negotiation-oriented public 
order policing methods observed more than 
two decades ago by PAJ Waddington (1994) in 
his two-year study of the MPS. Waddington’s 
basic revelation that senior MPS public order 
commanders were apt to use various forms of 
‘guile’ and ‘interactional ploys’ in order to induce 
(or even outfox) protest organisers into staging 
their marches and demonstrations more in 
accordance with police interests and objectives 
than those of the protest participants is certainly 
of relevance to the issues raised by Baker. The 
following article seeks to addresses this important 
oversight by reopening discussion, first set out in 
D. Waddington (2013) and D. Waddington and 
McSeveny (2012), of the recent police operation 
implemented by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) in 
response to the anti-Lib Dem protest, staged in 
Sheffield city centre in March 2011.
The first section of the article not only outlines 
the underlying principles and objectives of the 
Dialogue Policing approach, but also alludes to 
some of the possible difficulties associated with 
its practical application. The second section 
then summarises the main findings from PAJ 
Waddington’s important study of negotiation-
based policing in the MPS. These initial sections 
will provide the context for a case study, spanning 
four further sections, of the composition, ethos, 
activities and ‘effectiveness’ of the Police Liaison 
Team employed by SYP at the anti-Lib Dem 
protest, of any problems the team encountered, 
and of its relations both with protesters and 
‘more conventional’ public order Police Support 
Units (PSU). This case study will form the basis of 
a concluding section, focusing on the extent to 
which the type of methods implemented by SYP 
represent a novel, safer and more enlightened 
form of protest policing, and constitute a genuine 
and sincere attempt by the police to facilitate the 
‘right to protest’.
DIALOGUE POLICING: 
PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS
The Swedish Dialogue Policing approach has 
been comprehensively outlined by Holgersson 
and Knutsson (2011). According to these 
authors, it involves an overall commitment to: 
(i) ensuring the facilitation of the demonstrators’ 
legitimate goals, via self-policing if possible; (ii) 
using a ‘counterpart perspective’ to anticipate 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
32
the likely reactions of sections of the crowd to 
possible police interventions; and (iii) employing 
sufficient tactical differentiation to tailor police 
activities to the diversity of crowd. Its overriding 
objective is to ‘facilitate expressions of freedom 
of speech and the right to demonstrate’ in the 
hope of minimising confrontation, injury and 
destruction of property.
The majority of a dialogue officer’s work involves 
building up trusting relationships with organisers 
and protest groups, perhaps stretching over a 
period of several months, which can then serve 
as the basis for pre-event negotiation. Typically, 
such negotiation will involve determining agreed 
routes of marches and whether (and, if so, how 
close) they will be allowed to come in reach of 
sensitive buildings or locations. This process will 
inevitably result in compromise, or even give rise 
to partially or entirely novel sets of arrangements.
When on duty, dialogue officers operate in pairs. 
They are usually decked out in civilian clothes, 
but are distinguishable by yellow vests bearing 
the inscription ‘Dialogue Police’.
During the protest per se, the dialogue officers 
strive to ensure that prior agreements are 
upheld, work to sustain two-way communication 
between the police and demonstrators, attempt 
to de-escalate potentially conflictual incidents, 
and transmit regular readings of the changing 
moods of the crowd:
‘The aim of dialogue police officers is to be 
near critical places, enabling vital information, 
assessments, and feedback about problems and the 
police way of acting to be continuously passed on to 
the commanders. Police actions and interventions 
can also be explained to demonstrators. An 
important function is to try to influence a plan or 
ongoing activity by the police that may be perceived 
as provocative by the demonstrators’. (ibid., p. 204)
Holgersson and Knutsson (2011) concede that 
this inherent role dichotomy has resulted in 
dialogue police being looked upon as ‘traitors’ 
by their police colleagues and as ‘devious 
intelligence gatherers’ by protesters. Pressure 
exerted on them by commanders to simply gather 
intelligence and/or convey police directives to the 
crowd may conflict with their need to exercise 
discretion and avoid being seen as a police 
‘message boy’. Commanding officers sometimes 
accuse dialogue police of having become too 
sympathetic toward the demonstrators (having 
‘gone native’), and are apt to dismiss or overrule 
their observations and advice. Police of all 
ranks often feel frustrated by exhortations from 
dialogue officers to exercise more patience, 
restraint and compromise. Injunctions of this 
nature rob them of the customary satisfaction 
that comes from accomplishing things by force. 
To ask them to ‘stand back and do nothing’ in 
the presence of an ‘unruly’ crowd constitutes an 
insulting waste of their time and expertise, and 
involves a perceived dereliction of duty.
Wahlströhm (2007) points to similar attitudes 
among Swedish trainee public order 
commanders who resented the prospect of using 
communication as part of a process of give and 
take, rather than a means of insisting on outright 
public compliance. Certainly, Wahlströhm is far 
more explicit than Holgersson and Knuttsson 
in acknowledging the obvious tension existing 
between the Swedish police’s commitment 
to dialogue with protesters and the ‘purely 
instrumental dimension embedded in such 
interaction’ (Wahlströhm 2007, p. 400). He is 
clearly agnostic in asserting that
‘In sum, what is distinctive about the contemporary 
Swedish case is the (temporarily) high level of 
critical reflection among police regarding their 
interaction with protesters. Whether this will open 
up possibilities for genuinely more democratic forms 
of protest policing, or merely lead to nothing but 
more subtle forms of coercion, is still too early to 
say’. (ibid.)
NEGOTIATING PROTEST IN THE 
EARLY 1990S
Wahlströhm’s agnosticism echoes scepticism 
expressed by British academics in relation to 
more the ‘negotiated’ style of public order 
management introduced in the wake of high-
profile confrontations of the 1980s and early 
1990s around such issues as pit closures, 
the introduction of new technology and the 
inception of the poll tax. These commentators 
identified the new police methods as constituting 
arguably more subtle ways (‘the iron fist in the 
velvet glove’) of containing or repressing political 
dissent and of restoring some much-needed 
legitimacy to the police (King and Brearley, 
1996; D. Waddington, 1996, 1998). Ironically, 
evidence in favour of this view was contained in 
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empirical work undertaken by PAJ Waddington 
(1994, 1998), someone not customarily critical 
of the police. Waddington’s two-year participant 
observation study of public order policing in the 
MPS demonstrated the means by which senior 
officers were able successfully to achieve their 
objectives by using pre-event negotiation to 
ensure that protesters march peacefully along 
the police’s preferred route while causing a 
minimum of disruption and inconvenience to 
ongoing city life. In short, ‘Negotiation was 
less a process of “give and take” and more that 
of the organiser giving and the police taking. The 
police were enormously successful at ensuring that 
protest took place on their terms’ (Waddington, 
1994, p. 101).
Outcomes of this type were invariably secured 
via the police usage of a range of communicative 
‘ploys’ in the build-up to the protest, such as 
displays of spurious friendship towards organisers, 
donating helpful guidance and advice, or 
extending apparently unconditional favours.
‘Thus, negotiations are conducted with the 
amicability and good humor [sic] that would 
seem more appropriate to arranging a loan from 
a bank…Such amicability is not the product of 
genuine liking for or agreement with the organisers, 
the campaigns they represent, or their cause. It is a 
studied performance designed to dispel any tension, 
hostility or antagonism that the organiser might 
harbor [sic]. Once negotiation begins, the police 
stance is one of proffering help and advice — "How 
can we help you?" — "help you," that is, to "do it 
our way." Many organisers are inexperienced and so 
the police "organise it for them." They recommend 
routes along which to march, provide the telephone 
numbers of officials in other organisations that need 
to be contacted, and suggest how difficulties might 
be resolved’. (Waddington, 1998: 120-1)
The police know that contact and benevolence 
of this nature implicitly commits the organisers 
both to upholding an exchange relationship 
and assuming a position of mutual responsibility 
for potential problems that might occur 
(Waddington, 1994, p. 84). Police and organisers 
thus have a shared interest in the outcome of the 
demonstration — hence, the greater propensity 
for relevant information and intelligence to be 
reciprocated, especially in relation to groups or 
individuals deemed likely to be ‘troublemakers’ 
(ibid.). This arguably cynical side to the police 
involvement is underlined by Waddington’s 
further disclosure that,
‘(A)lthough the police might have genuine 
affection for some organisers, the appearance 
of friendliness was often a studied performance. 
Almost unfailingly, organisers’ veracity and 
competence were subjected to withering scrutiny 
the moment they left the negotiating meeting. On 
some occasions, police officers, who a few minutes 
earlier were friendly to the point of being unctuous, 
denigrated the organisers’ personal qualities…
Indeed, all organisers tended to be regarded with 
suspicion’. (Waddington, 1994, p. 87)
Other pre-event measures are undertaken to 
offset the risk of any individual or teams of officers 
engaging in ‘ill-considered’ actions likely to spark 
off unwanted confrontation. This is typically 
achieved by: (a) determining that only the most 
capable and trusted public order commanders 
get assigned to the event; (b) engaging in pre-
event ‘strategy meetings’ in which all tactical 
contingencies are discussed’; and (c) ensuring 
that all junior ranks are thoroughly briefed 
in terms of the operational goals and ethos. 
Police interaction with organisers and other 
protesters on the day of the event will also exude 
ostentatious bonhomie; riot police (though 
heavily tooled up and at-the-ready if needed) will 
be kept well out of sight of the demonstrators 
and senior officers will jump at any opportunity 
to brief civilian stewards and their marshals in 
terms of the collaborative relationship the police 
are hoping will prevail.
It is by exercising such means that the MPS 
routinely accomplished ‘nonconfrontational 
control’ over protest demonstrations, based on 
the compliance of the organisers (Waddington, 
1998, p. 123). PAJ Waddington is adamant 
that police public order commanders pride 
themselves on their professional commitment 
to ‘recognising the unquestioned right’ of all 
citizens to protest (ibid., p. 129). Waddington 
further contends that
‘Police officers recoil from the suggestion that they 
are sometimes deceitful, but deception is a routine 
feature of social exchange. Their friendliness towards 
organisers was often ‘spurious’ but no more so 
than that displayed by a salesman to a customer’. 
(Waddington, 1994, p. 102)
He nonetheless acknowledges that, somewhere 
amidst this process of ensuring that demonstrations 
are conducted largely on police terms, the 
interests of the protesters are correspondingly 
compromised: ‘Protest is [thus] emasculated 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
34
and induced to conform to the avoidance of 
trouble. In police argot, protest organisers are 
‘had over’ [in other words, intentionally duped]’ 
(ibid., p. 198).
RESEARCH METHODS AND 
OBJECTIVES
The remainder of this article is now devoted to 
evaluating the extent to which SYP’s decision 
to employ a police liaison approach (based on 
principles of dialogue policing) actually reflects 
a sincere and significant shift towards a more 
enlightened and facilitating contemporary 
style of public order policing, or may be more 
justifiably regarded as a merely a modern, more 
subtle manifestation of the type of cynical police 
methods being exercised some twenty years ago.
The relevant data on which the following 
discussion is based derive from an ethnographic 
study in which the author and ten volunteer 
academic colleagues acted as participant 
observers, while a full-time research assistant 
engaged in retrospective and contemporaneous 
tracking of police Twitter messages and other 
social media channels of relevance to the 
protest (e.g. Facebook, Indymedia and the local 
Sheffield Forum). Eleven in-depth interviews 
were also carried out with police personnel (the 
Gold, Assistant Gold and Silver Commanders; a 
Silver negotiator/coordinator; two Public Order 
Bronze Commanders; the Bronze, two sub-
Bronzes and a police constable forming part of 
the ‘Police Liaison Team’; and a Social Media 
Officer) and three protest organisers — the Chair 
of the Sheffield Anti-Cuts Alliance (SACA, see 
below), a SACA Steering Committee member, 
and the President of Sheffield Hallam University’s 
Students’ Union (SU).
THE SHEFFIELD ‘ANTI-LIB DEM’ 
RALLY
The Sheffield anti-Lib Dem protest of March 
2011 was called and organised by a coalition of 
local trade union groups and political activists 
calling itself the Sheffield Anti-Cuts Alliance 
(SACA). Following the formation one year 
earlier of a Coalition Government between the 
Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties, 
Nick Clegg (the newly appointed Deputy Prime 
Minister, but also Lib Dem leader and MP for 
Sheffield Hallam) had nominated Sheffield City 
Hall as the venue for his party’s Annual Spring 
Conference in what was regarded, at the time, 
as a benevolent gesture to his ‘home town’. 
Since then, however, the Lib Dems and their 
leader had become locally unpopular, having 
co-sanctioned with the Conservatives a raft 
of controversial policies (e.g. sweeping public 
sector spending cuts and the raising of university 
tuition fees) which appeared to contradict their 
pre-election promises. This apparent ‘betrayal’ 
of the electorate went down especially badly 
in Sheffield, which is the home of two major 
universities (Sheffield Hallam and the University 
of Sheffield) and is disproportionately reliant 
on public sector employment in comparison to 
most other major cities (D. Waddington, 2013).
The prospect of Mr Clegg and his party 
receiving a rowdy local reception had a major 
bearing on the strategies and tactics underlying 
SYP’s Operation Obelisk, though other factors 
were undoubtedly also influential. According 
to the Gold Commander, the recent ‘Adapting 
to Protest’ reports (HMCIC, 2009a, 2009b) 
had underlined the legal imperatives under 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
to uphold (and, indeed, facilitate) the right to 
protest, as well as ensure the safety of the Lib 
Dem delegates and the security of the venue. 
Due consideration also had to be given to making 
sure that city centre shops, cafes, hotels and 
restaurants were sufficiently unaffected by the 
protest to benefit from the influx of conference 
attendees, and that the city’s image as a ‘safe’ 
and ‘friendly’ tourist or conference centre would 
hopefully be enhanced.
To SYP’s great relief and satisfaction, the two days 
of protest were virtually trouble-free. A relatively 
small crowd of 800 protesters gathering on the 
afternoon of Friday, 11 March, in anticipation of 
the arrival of Lib Dem delegates, posed no real 
problems for the police. Then, on the following 
morning, a larger crowd of 2 000 - 3000 people 
(which subsequently grew in size to around 5 
000) set off on a two-mile march through the 
city before finally assembling on Barker’s Pool, a 
pedestrian concourse directly in front of the City 
Hall. The only noteworthy incidents occurred 
when 30 members of UK Uncut (a grass-roots 
movement employing direct action to highlight 
alternatives to the British government’s policy 
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of reducing public spending) were ejected from 
a handful of stores and the branch of a well-
known High Street bank, and when a 24-year-old 
man ignited a firework flare and scaled a police 
protective barrier in what resulted in the only 
arrest of the entire event.
It is indisputable that the presence of this 
barrier, which was integral to a part-metal, part-
concrete ‘fence’, encircling the City Hall venue, 
was fundamental to the success of the police 
operation, insofar as it helped limit direct contact 
between police and protesters, while still enabling 
the latter to remain within sight and sound of 
the arriving Lib Dem delegates. Arguably of even 
more significance, however, were the activities of 
the 15-person Police Liaison Team (PLT), which 
engaged in pre-event discussion and negotiation 
with protest organisers, and then mingled with 
the crowds on the two days of the event with the 
intentions of facilitating protest and promoting 
a ‘no surprises approach’ to the policing of the 
demonstration.
THE POLICE LIAISON TEAM: 
ETHOS AND OBJECTIVES
Previous publications (e.g. D. Waddington, 2011, 
2013) have emphasised that SYP’s decision to 
adopt a deliberately ‘facilitating’ police liaison 
approach to their handling of the anti-Lib Dem 
protest reflected an enduring force commitment 
to restoring public trust and confidence in the 
wake of the their controversial roles in the 1984-
5 miners’ strike and the 1989 Hillsborough 
stadium disaster (see esp. D. Waddington [2011] 
for a fuller discussion of these cases). Interviewees 
also referred to the progressive and liberal-
minded attitudes of their more senior colleagues 
as another determinant of this novel strategic 
direction. Particular emphasis was placed on 
the fact that SYP’s Chief Constable currently 
occupied the position of ACPO (Association of 
Chief Police Officers) Lead on public order, and 
had recently signed off a document committing 
all British forces to a more communication-
oriented approach (ACPO/ACPO/NPIA, 2010).
‘I can’t speak about other areas, but I do think 
that, in this force we are very alive to and 
receptive to these types of ideas and relatively 
forward-thinking…and I do think that we’re 
extremely keen to embrace all of this stuff. I also 
think that [The Silver Commander’s] openness to 
looking at new ideas was also really encouraging 
from an operational and planning point of view’. 
(Interview, Public Order Bronze)
One main objective of the police operation was 
to provide the Silver Commander with what 
he termed an ‘information picture’ of the likely 
size and composition of the crowd, of which 
constituent sections or individuals were liable to 
prove cooperative or not, and of what policing 
measures were therefore necessary to balance 
the right to protest with the corresponding need 
to maintain public order. A second important 
goal was to cultivate a ‘no surprises’ approach 
whereby the intentions and activities of all parties 
were as well communicated, predictable and 
mutually endorsed a possible. The final, arguably 
overriding, police objective was to enhance their 
capacity to make sensible, well-informed tactical 
interventions:
‘The third bit for me was that I wanted the 
capability to build a dynamic risk assessment 
to assist actual decision-making — about the 
potential impact of police tactics, really, so we 
could have that discussion around ‘What’s the 
best approach, here, to deal with that element 
of the crowd, in your view from the vantage point 
of being down amongst the crowd?’ (Interview, 
Silver Commander)
To accomplish these objectives, the Silver 
Commander set up a 15-person Police Liaison 
Team (PLT), to be centrally coordinated on the 
day of the event by a remote ‘Silver Command’ 
team consisting of himself and an assistant 
Negotiator Co-ordinator, a female colleague of 
equal rank. This pair worked in close conjunction 
with a five-person Social Media Team (SMT), 
led by a female inspector, whose function was 
to monitor and respond to relevant messages 
appearing on Twitter, Facebook and the Sheffield 
Forum blog, and to transmit informative and 
reassuring messages to protesters and members 
of the wider general public.
While immediate overall authority over the PLT 
was assigned to a Bronze commander at Chief 
Inspector level (the ‘PLT Bronze’), during the 
protest proper the team was divided up into equal 
sub-groups of five. The first of these consisted of 
four lower-ranking officers (sergeants or police 
constables) under the direct supervision of the 
PLT Bronze, and the remaining two of similar 
groups of junior officers which each reported to 
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a ‘sub-Bronze’ commander of Inspector level. 
In addition to each having experience of public 
order leadership, the PLT Bronze, two sub-
Bronzes and Negotiator Co-ordinator were all 
highly trained ‘crisis negotiators’.
The lower ranks of the PLT were made up of 
hand-picked individuals who were already 
highly regarded (e.g. due to their work 
on Safer Neighbourhood Teams) for their 
communication skills and capacity to engage 
with the general public: ‘The type of individuals 
who, they already knew, were not quick on the 
draw, and who could handle people with some 
patience while keeping up a pleasant smile’ 
(Interview, PLT Sub-bronze). Steps were taken 
to ensure that the public was able to see the PLT 
as visibly and qualitatively ‘different’ from the 
other police present:
‘In the old days of public order, the police were 
the forbidding black line, but now people see 
fluorescent jackets and it’s ‘Look out, here come the 
police!’ So, we deliberately went for something very 
different. We went for blue tabards with ‘Liaison 
Officer’ on them, which deliberately kept us very 
separate from the other officers’. (Interview, PLT 
Sub-bronze)
This general commitment to a softer, 
communications-based approach to protest 
policing was exemplified by the attitudes 
of two strategically important commanding 
officers, the PLT Bronze and the Public Order 
Bronze commander with overall responsibility 
for deploying PSUs at the actual protest 
venue. The former had followed Silver’s 
recommendation by attending a one-day 
professional development course at Liverpool 
University, where participants were addressed 
by a specialist in Swedish Dialogue Policing 
methods and a principal legal adviser to the 
HMCIC ‘Adapting to Protest’ inquiry:
‘To be honest, one of the things that stick in my 
mind is that there was a Chief Superintendent from 
somewhere or other who asked a question along 
the lines of: “Aren’t we bending over backwards for 
the protest groups?" And [the legal adviser] gave 
him a great answer that will always stick in my 
mind. She said to him, "Your job is to uphold the 
law, and the Human Rights Act is the law. That’s 
your job and you can’t pick and choose which bits 
of the law you like.” And I must say that I came 
away and built our briefings and tactics around 
that statement’. (Interview, PLT Bronze)
His Bronze public order counterpart explained 
in interview how it was the political conviction 
resulting from a family background of trade union 
support and the insight provided by subsequent 
university education which enabled him also to 
‘buy into’ this softer policing style. Previously, 
he reckoned, the ‘British model of policing’ had 
been unfairly designed to serve the rich, and 
he therefore welcomed the progression to a 
more universal appreciation of people’s rights: 
‘These rights are there for all of us to enjoy and, 
in the past, I don’t think we’ve been sufficiently 
conscious of that. So, yes, I do buy into it’.
PRE-EVENT LIAISON
During pre-event planning for Operation Obelisk, 
the Silver Commander stated a preference for the 
march to follow a clearly prescribed route, which 
(for safety reasons) would involve protesters 
departing from tradition by not bearing down on 
the City Hall via Devonshire Street, and taking a 
more circuitous route via the lower end of town. 
Pre-event liaison with organisers was therefore 
geared to using standard sets of negotiating 
skills a la the Metropolitan police commanders 
observed by PAJ Waddington twenty years 
earlier. Such repertoires would be used, not only 
to gain the demonstrators’ compliance with 
the preferred route, but also to optimise police 
intelligence and thereby ensure that there would 
be ‘no surprises’ from any party’s perspective on 
the day.
‘We have these things called “bunches of fives” in 
negotiator terms, which are basically reasons to do 
something. If you’re negotiating with someone over 
the phone or face-to-face, it’s always good practice 
to have these bunches of fives: five reasons not to 
kill yourself; five reasons to go this way down the 
street; five reasons to let hostages go, and so on. We 
also have something else called PPAs — “Positive 
Police Actions” — where it’s a kind of reciprocity 
thing, really: “This is what we’ve done for you. 
What can you do for us?” So, we were looking round 
in terms of, ‘What can we bring from negotiating, 
from crisis and hostage intervention, into dealing 
with people who aren’t overtly hostile, but who are 
not anticipating police in their midst. It was a case 
of: “How can we sell what we want to happen on 
that day, rather than enforcing it?” So, we’d got 
rehearsed bunches of fives as to why they should 
take that route’. (Interview, PLT Sub-bronze)
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The police modus operandi involved contacting 
key organisers, such as SACA personnel and the 
presidents of the Sheffield Hallam University and 
University of Sheffield student unions. The SACA 
representative was personally escorted round the 
proposed route of the march, and the perceived 
merits similarly explained (in bunches of five) to 
student union officers during visits by the trained 
negotiators:
‘But that’s undoubtedly where the skill and the craft 
of the liaison team came to the fore, because it was 
about them saying: “Well, actually, if we take you 
down Fitzwilliam Street, you go along Charter Row, 
down onto Pinstone Street, you’re going past the 
seat of democracy in Sheffield, the Town Hall; you’ve 
got a longer march route, so you’re going to get more 
people seeing and hearing what you’re protesting 
about and guarantee prime locations for the media to 
be able to pick up and monitor what you’re doing”’. 
(Interview, Negotiator Co-ordinator)
The ‘guided tour’ accorded to the SACA 
representative also provided an opportunity 
for police intelligence-gathering and for the 
two parties to learn of each other’s intentions: 
‘All through the route, we were just chatting 
about the policing, what they expected of us, 
what we expected of them, and basically he 
was picking my brain for how many numbers 
we expected, and quite reasonable things such 
as what we expected might happen’ (Interview, 
SACA Representative). The police also used 
existing communication channels between Safer 
Neighbourhood officers and the students’ union 
to accumulate similar intelligence and insight:
‘We agreed to this, and he came and asked us: 
one, what we had planned for the event; and 
two, whether we had any idea what other groups 
might be planning for it. I’m signed up to a lot of 
databases with various cuts movements and things, 
so we made a point of relaying to the police any 
information arising from emails, and that sort of 
thing, that we thought might be relevant. We have 
an open line with the police all year round and we 
always feel that we can talk to them in confidence, 
and vice-versa, so it was all about keeping that 
dialogue open with them’. (Interview, Sheffield 
Hallam University SU President)
Equivalent questions were asked of the University 
of Sheffield SU President, who was able to 
provide some helpful observations, based on 
the appearance of graffiti, leaflets and online 
communication, of the intentions of participating 
groups which had chosen not to liaise with the 
police. The content and tone of such discussions 
helped reassure the police that the students 
unions were out to avoid and, indeed, distance 
themselves from the type of violent protest 
that had been witnessed during the London 
demonstration:
‘We certainly had groups who weren’t that open 
in their communication and were quite covert in 
their ambitions, so there was always that element 
of the unknown. But overall, we felt pretty secure 
from meeting their representatives that we knew 
just how 80 per cent of the people wanted the 
protest to turn out…. The brief was to come up with 
a way to communicate more effectively with the 
protest groups… to show that, as a police service, 
we’d made a measured approach and been sort of 
proportionate. If people then chose not to listen to 
what we were asking them to do to work together 
with us in what we were trying to achieve, then we’d 
at least have some legitimacy for any more robust 
police action that might eventually prove necessary’. 
(Interview, Negotiator Co-ordinator)
As part of their ‘no surprises’ approach, PLT officers 
asked organisers whether any of the proposed 
police tactics made them feel uncomfortable 
or might risk worrying or aggravating their 
constituents. The police emphasised how 
they wanted to avoid kettling at all costs, but 
maintained that, should the need ever arise, 
liaison officers would immediately appear to set 
the innocent free. The PLT Bronze presented each 
organiser with his card and maintained regular 
contact in the days leading up to the protest. A 
further example of this strong ‘personal touch’ 
was his assurance to the Hallam union president 
that, ‘If I ever found myself in a kettle, I could 
give him a ring and he’d personally come and let 
me out’ (Interview, Sheffield Hallam University 
SU President).
The Hallam SU branch had recently received a 
statement by a group which threatened to smash 
up the union building because they had been 
refused permission to stage a conference there 
on the day of the protest. The moment the police 
became aware of this they assigned officers to 
guard the building. This underlying commitment 
to building rapport and establishing the basis of 
an exchange relationship was further evident in 
the PLT’s undertaking to set up a sound system for 
one group of protesters which would otherwise 
have been banned from the protest.
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‘I’ve no doubt that, had they gone to the police line, 
the bobbies’ response would have been: “My briefing 
is you can’t bring that down here, so therefore the 
answer is no.” Because they’d heard this approach, 
the Police Liaison Team, who was already identifiable 
as the resolvers of these sorts of issues, said, “Yes, 
we can do that for you. Some of the [PLT] will go 
down and we’ll get that set up for you, no problem”. 
So straight away you’re starting to build up a 
relationship, and it starts to provide a principle for 
trading’. (Interview, Silver Commander)
On the day of the march, the PLT exchanged 
first names and phone numbers with any 
organisers and stewards they had previously 
had no contact with. Thereafter, both parties 
maintained an amicable working relationship 
whereby, according to the Chair of SACA, the 
police ‘worked with us on the march and joked 
with us constantly’.
THE PLT IN PRACTICE
Police respondents maintain that this kind of 
preparatory work yielded extremely important 
dividends. One such benefit occurred on the 
first day of the protest when a Lib Dem delegate 
who was due to stand in the forthcoming 
election for Lord Mayor of London suddenly, 
and without warning, entered the growing 
crowd of protesters as they awaited the arrival 
of conference participants. Once there, he rather 
heatedly explained to the encircling crowd 
members why their political views were so 
misguided. According to the Silver Commander, 
the ‘highly volatile situation’ created by this 
unanticipated manoeuvre was rendered 
potentially more combustible by the unhelpful 
activities of one particular member of the crowd 
who was a ‘known troublemaker’:
‘I can’t name this guy, but we had a student 
leader, for example, who we know was desperate 
to get people motivated, but we neutered him: he 
was completely ineffective because of the PLT’s 
intervention and the way they went to work. He 
just didn’t get the support he needed’. (Interview, 
Silver Commander)
Silver conceded that, had he been forced to 
respond to this incident on the evidence of CCTV 
footage alone, he would not have hesitated from 
sending in a Police Support Unit (of up to 22 
officers with specialist training in public order). 
However, the feedback he received from the 
PLT Bronze, who was positioned a mere two 
metres away from the actual incident, provided 
an altogether more accurate dynamic risk 
assessment on which to gauge his response:
‘All of the time, I was sending messages on my radio 
to [The Negotiator Co-ordinator], saying “Tell Silver 
not to do anything. Tell Silver not to react and send 
any resources in because, in actual fact, this crowd 
is self-policing”. As he was saying, “Can I be allowed 
the floor?” there were other protesters trying to 
shout him down, but there were others still who 
were insisting: “No, quiet! He’s come into speak, so 
let him have his say”. And I found it fascinating to 
watch, and it was the first time it struck me that 
we had ended up directly influencing police tactics’. 
(Interview, PLT Bronze)
Several similar instances arose on the second day 
of the protest. For example, a series of timely 
observations by the PLT team ensured that Silver 
Command rightly regarded such activities as 
youths repeatedly beating the perimeter fence 
with wooden placard handles or daubing graffiti 
on a statue (with chalk, rather than paint, as 
it had initially been assumed) as considerably 
more innocuous than they had seemed on first 
appearances. When the only arrest of the entire 
event was made, and PLT officers insisted that a 
pair of firework flares also be extinguished, Silver 
Command resisted the urge to deploy a PSU in 
favour of allowing his officers’ relationship with 
the protesters to peacefully prevail:
‘If you remember, they lit up the flare and that lad 
jumped over the barrier. It was the only arrest and, 
ironically, he brought it on himself by jumping over. 
If he’d just stayed where he were, flare or no flare, 
he’d have been fine. But then they lit the second 
one and [the PLT Bronze] went in, and there was 
a small minority that started chanting to ‘kettle’ 
us. In fact, they were some of the people who’d 
been telling me: “You stand for everything that I’m 
against”. Even then, although I put my flame-proof 
gloves on, because I was thinking “I might have to 
grab that flare”, there wasn’t one moment when 
I felt threatened or really afraid for Scott, because 
I thought “We’ve got most of these people on our 
side’’‘. (Interview, Police Constable/PLT Member)
This heavy application of police patience and 
discretion was perhaps most starkly emphasised 
by their decision not to restrict the movements of 
members of UK Uncut — a strategy that apparently 
backfired in light of the damage inflicted on shops 
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and High Street banks. The Silver Commander 
regarded this as a small and ultimately necessary 
price to pay: ‘I mean, it’s regrettable that Top 
Shop was done but the trouble we’ve got now 
in terms of facilitating protest is that you can’t 
have a system that’s so restrictive from the off 
that it guarantees the protection of every single 
property in town’. Among the resulting plaudits 
was a tribute paid by the SACA representative, 
a very seasoned demonstrator who maintained 
that the policing of this event was ‘completely 
different from’ anything he had previously 
experienced, and represented, for example, ‘an 
astonishing contrast with what happened at 
Bolton [in Lancashire]’ where, he alleged, the 
police had been far too rough and over-zealous 
in their handling of anti-English Defence League 
protesters who had gathered to show their 
disapproval of an ongoing EDL rally.
It is equally indisputable, however, that the speed 
with which the police responded to the activities 
of UK Uncut protesters was a testament to the 
strength of the back-up they had ready and 
waiting to deal with this and, should the need 
have arisen, even more serious developments. As 
the Public Order Bronze explained, SYP had set 
up a ‘forward holding point’ on nearby Trippett 
Lane, enabling him, to ‘get three PSUs at the 
drop of a hat’. Moreover, notwithstanding its 
undoubtedly sincere underlying commitment 
to facilitating protest, the work of the PLTs was 
seen, by senior commanders at least, as a tool 
for establishing and ensuring strict adherence to 
a set of ground rules ultimately determined by 
the police:
‘Part of the whole idea about protest liaison is that 
it’s actually at the heart of a “no surprises” policing 
approach, so that people were able to understand 
where those parameters were. In truth, if you’d 
have climbed over that second set of barriers, you’d 
have not gone any further! There was this phased 
approach from a very light initial contact, to quite 
a hard sort of policing tactic if that was required’. 
(Interview, Silver Commander)
EXPLORING TACTICAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Police respondents were unanimous in 
considering it necessary to preserve a clear 
distinction between the operational functions 
of the PLT and ‘conventional’ public order units. 
The latter officers were perfectly content to let 
their PLT counterparts do any ‘engaging’ with the 
public:
‘Traditionally, there’s always been that wariness that, 
if you start talking to protesters, they might take it as 
an invitation to get on your back with, “Don’t you 
feel guilty standing there and suppressing our right 
to protest?”…Invariably, somebody would get pulled 
into a conversation and get quoted and have their 
photo put up on Indymedia…I think that, whilst 
most police officers are happy with the introduction 
of liaison teams, I think they’re also content to leave 
the talking to them while they just stand back and 
say nothing’. (Interview, Public Order Bronze)
Another perceived benefit of the liaison process 
was that it greatly reduced the potential both for 
direct confrontation and any ensuing political 
controversy:
‘The whole purpose of it for me is that, if I don’t have 
to ask one of my officers to get their baton out and 
hit somebody with it, I’ll sleep a lot better at night. 
Alright, we all have these off adrenaline rushes 
from time to time — we’re only human — but you 
really don’t want to be scrapping with anybody: (a) 
because one or both of you might get hurt, and (b) 
do a ‘Tomlinson’ where, one push, and the man goes 
down and doesn’t get up. It doesn’t bear thinking 
about, really’. (Interview, Public Order Bronze)
Respondents of all ranks were satisfied that the 
use of PLTs was destined to become a permanent 
part of what Silver Command termed the ‘public 
order toolkit’:
‘It’s the question of how far that toolkit extends that’s 
really the challenge for me. Having seen both sides 
as a public order commander as well, there is a limit 
to how quickly you can get involved and there will 
always be groups who don’t liaise, however much 
you try, so there will be times when that conventional 
policing will — probably rightly — come to the 
fore. For this to work, it’s almost as if there’s got 
to be a segregation in the minds of the protesters 
between the ‘good’ cops and the potentially ‘bad’‘. 
(Interview, Negotiator Co-ordinator)
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These senior officers unanimously maintained that, 
in situations where there is no Silver to direct them, 
overall decision-making responsibility should rest 
with the Public Order Bronze Commander, rather 
than his PLT counterpart:
‘It’s got to be his or her decision whether to let 
the Police Liaison Team go in or not, because he’s 
the one with the ultimate responsibility for getting 
them out. It should always be his call. The other 
important point is that, whilst we managed this 
mainly with unprotected staff and the primary tactic 
of negotiation did work, the ability to move quickly 
from state of engagement to another with a higher 
level of force and wider capability is essential for 
the balancing of rights to be achieved’. (Interview, 
Public Order Bronze)
PLT members were acutely aware that rank-and-file 
colleagues in conventional public order PSUs had 
developed slightly cynical and resentful attitudes 
towards them as a result of their liaison work. 
One PLT Sub-bronze recalled how he ‘actually 
got deadpanned’ by junior colleagues who would 
have been more friendly and deferential on any 
other day. This reflected a common rank-and-file 
perception that the PLT had ceded far too much 
authority to the protesters and appeared to have 
forgotten their true allegiance in the process. The 
PLT conceded that there was an element of truth 
in this latter accusation:
‘You almost get sucked in: it isn’t true Stockholm 
Syndrome, but you do start to get pulled into 
another way of thinking. There comes a point 
when you look across the lines of fluorescents and 
do start thinking, “Well actually, these guys do 
look quite oppressive. Why are we doing that?’’’ 
(Interview, PLT Sub-bronze)
In the immediate wake of the protest, an ostensibly 
playful but pointedly meaningful form of ‘ribbing’ 
occurred whereby the PLT were variously derided 
by PSU colleagues as ‘pink fluffies’ or ‘PCSOs’ [part-
time civilian Police Community Support Officers].
Similar forms of teasing were used to remind PLT 
members that the PSUs had been stood around all 
day doing ‘real police work’ while liaison officers 
were hob-nobbing with protesters and reaping 
all the glory. Such sentiments could not erase 
the sense of pride and satisfaction PLT members 
derived from having made such a singular and 
telling contribution:
‘I thought it was something new and challenging, 
and refreshingly experimental. I thought we were 
doing something that was really worthwhile and had 
already received that endorsement from our senior 
ranks…Afterwards, the camaraderie among the 
team and desire to take it further was paramount, 
just as the desire to be re-utilised in that role was very, 
very strong’. (Interview, PLT Sub-bronze)
CONCLUSION
It is evident that SYP’s deployment of police 
liaison officers as part of Operation Obelisk was 
extremely redolent of the strategic approach 
being used by the MPS to manage demonstrations 
occurring in London over twenty years ago. The 
modern, European emphasis on using various 
negotiating skills and communicative devices in 
order to develop rapport with protest organisers 
and set up an ‘exchange relationship’ therefore 
represents a continuation of methods employed 
in a bygone era. Moreover, the objectives of this 
approach remain essentially familiar, in that they 
are primarily designed to maximise intelligence 
(relating to the likely size, composition, 
intentions and willingness to cooperate of the 
crowd), set police parameters regarding what 
sort of behaviours will and will not be tolerated, 
establish the legitimacy of the police operation, 
and therefore provide advance justification for 
any potentially contentious police interventions.
What is undoubtedly novel about the introduction 
of PLTs is the way in which they are being used 
during demonstrations, both to ensure that police 
and protesters alike experience no unsettling 
or provocative ‘surprises’, and to provide 
remotely based command teams with accurate 
‘dynamic risk assessments’ from which to avoid 
unnecessarily over-reactive or indiscriminating 
police interventions. The Sheffield case study 
is therefore consistent with related research on 
the MPS and Sussex Constabulary (Stott et al., 
2013) which shows how similar police liaison 
initiatives have contributed to more effective 
police decision-making and made it much easier 
for the police to defuse potential conflict.
Thus, on the one hand, there was a universal 
recognition among interview respondents of 
the immense instrumental value of liaison-
based policing. The present case study further 
suggests that, certainly at the levels of Gold and 
Silver command, and among the various ranks of 
PLT officers, there was a correspondingly unified 
acceptance of and commitment to facilitating the 
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rights and goals of law-abiding protesters. Like 
these officers, the Public Order Bronze embraced 
the view that a communication-based ‘dialogue’ 
approach was best suited to this purpose. This 
was a view less wholeheartedly subscribed to by 
members of more ‘conventional’ public order 
police support units, who strongly criticised 
the ‘over-appeasing’ attitudes seemingly being 
extended to protesters, accused their PLT 
colleagues of implicit disloyalty, and objected to 
being asked to stand around while sections of 
the public were allowed to behave in what was 
perceived as an unlawful and/or unacceptable 
manner. The extent to which frustrations of this 
nature might have well been vented had the PSUs 
been called on to intervene was a possibility not 
tested in the present example.
There is no evidence that liaison policing has 
now become regarded as utopian — a panacea 
in itself. Even those respondents counting 
themselves among the foremost advocates 
of liaison policing would see such methods as 
merely complementary (‘another part of the 
toolkit’), and by no means a substitute for, more 
conventional forms of public order policing. 
None of our respondents would object to the 
presence of adequately equipped riot-trained 
colleagues, available on stand-by. Nor would 
they contest the right of conventional public 
order commanders to assume ultimate authority 
in the context of political protests. Indeed, PLT 
officers accept that a large part of their function 
is to initially help determine, and subsequently 
keep reminding protesters of, the existence 
of ‘lines in the sand’ which may be used to 
legitimise and politically justify uncompromising 
police interventions.
There is some resonance here with PAJ 
Waddington’s important observation that
‘…styles of public order policing are contingent on 
the institutional context in which they take place. 
In liberal democracies, there is a preference for 
nonconfrontational methods and a trend towards 
institutionalisation because this is relatively trouble-
free. The police are also competent in achieving 
their goals by nonconfrontational means. On the 
other hand, when the established social, political, 
and economic institutions are perceived to be under 
threat, institutional pressures will encourage more 
confrontational methods of public order policing, 
as happened in Britain during the miners’ strike of 
1984-85’. (1998, p. 139)
It has been argued both here and elsewhere 
(D. Waddington, 2011, 2013) that SYP’s 
contemporary policing mission is underpinned 
by a commitment to purging lingering 
animosities originating from the miners’ strike 
and Hillsborough stadium tragedy. The force’s 
keen determination to facilitate the ‘right’ to 
protest has been reinforced in light of recent 
political influence associated with the ‘Adapting 
to Protest’ reports and enhanced accountability 
stemming from the growth of social media and 
citizen journalism. Such tolerance may even run, 
as in the present example, to allowing potentially 
recalcitrant groups like UK Uncut the temporary 
freedom to roam the streets ‘unsupervised’. 
However, without wishing to doubt the 
earnestness of the officers involved, it appears 
likely that SYP’s publicly-stated determination 
to facilitate the right to protest would be hard 
pressed to survive the occurrence of conflict as 
politically contentious and threatening to the 
state as ‘another miners’ strike’.
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